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Background: In the UK, police custody officers have a responsibility to screen for health morbidity and vulnerability
among detainees. This study aimed to develop an understanding of the barriers to performing effective health
screening in police custody suites, understand the impact of screening tools on practice within the custody suite,
and to identify factors that could hinder or facilitate the future implementation of a new screening intervention in
this environment.
Methods: A qualitative study was conducted alongside a quantitative evaluation of a novel screening tool.
Qualitative methods included observation of the custody environment, semi-structured interviews with police staff,
and elicitation of comments from detainees about their experiences of screening. Data were analysed inductively
using thematic analysis. Normalization Process Theory (NPT) was used to inform data collection and as a framework
for higher level analysis of findings.
Results: Five overall constructs were identified that develop understanding of the integration of health screening
within custody: the workability of risk assessment screening tools; the effect of the custody environment and the
people therein; shifts in professional roles and interrelationships amongst staff; cultural responses to risk and liability
in police work; how infrastructure, knowledge and skills can impact on detainee safety.
Conclusions: Health and risk assessment screening in police custody is a complex and demanding activity which
extends beyond the delivery of a screening tool. Professional roles, the demanding environment and police culture
impact on the overall process. Recommendations for improved integration of health and risk assessment screening
in wider police custody practice are proposed.
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Criminal justice systemBackground
Health morbidity among detainees in prisons worldwide
has been well described [1, 2], and there is now a grow-
ing interest in the health and welfare of police custody
detainees [3]. Emergent international literature high-
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amongst police detainees compared to general popula-
tion estimates [4–8]. In addition, a number of studies
have raised concerns about the ability of police custody
officers to identify health needs, and calls for improve-
ments in screening have been made [9, 10].
The treatment of police custody detainees varies from
country to country, but in the UK any individual who is
arrested must have their detention authorised by a police
Custody Officer (CO). COs (sometimes known in the
UK as desk sergeants) must independently scrutinise anle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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that the conditions for detention are met. COs are also
responsible for the identification of health morbidity and
vulnerability among detainees and this is a key part of
their safe detention. However COs as police officers are
not clinically trained. Furthermore, there is evidence of
shortcomings in routine screening (known by the police
as “risk assessment”), especially for detainees with ser-
ious injuries, chronic physical health problems, mental
disorders and vulnerability and those at risk of alcohol
withdrawal [9, 11] with calls for the introduction of evi-
dence based structured screening [12]. As discussed
above, international studies show similar patterns of ex-
cess health morbidity, but the arrangements for the
provision of healthcare in police settings, the process for
how detainees are screened and access care, and the
reporting of health outcomes vary substantially between
nations [13].
From our Health Screening of People in Police
Custody (HELP-PC) project in London UK, we
previously published data from phases 1 and 2 which de-
scribed deficiencies in the screening of physical, psychi-
atric and substance related disorders by COs [11, 14].
Phase 1 comprised an audit of custody records to ascer-
tain the prevalence of morbidities documented by COs,
and additionally to obtain a power calculation for phase
2. In phase 2, detainees underwent structured interviews
by clinical researchers; the findings from these inter-
views were then compared to information recorded on
the custody records to ascertain the sensitivity and spe-
cificity of the police risk assessment screen.
At that time, the Metropolitan Police Service in
London used a computerised custody records system
“NSPIS”1 which contained a risk assessment screening
tool embedded into the program [15]. During phases 1
and 2, the NSPIS risk assessment being used (version
MR09b) comprised 16 questions and 12 observations for
the CO to assess the need for further intervention for
the detainee. In phase 3, a new risk assessment screening
tool was developed by the research team and was piloted
in 2012. This is described in more detail in the methods
section below. These three phases are henceforth re-
ferred to as the ‘quantitative evaluation’ of the HELP-PC
project.
Among the deficiencies in standard custody risk as-
sessment screening uncovered in phases 1 and 2 of
the HELP-PC project were substantial numbers of
missed cases of Diabetes Mellitus, cardiovascular dis-
orders, Serious Mental Illness, intellectual and devel-
opmental disorders, risk of alcohol withdrawal
syndrome, and detainees at high risk of suicide. The
results of this pilot showed an improvement in the
detection of key health morbidities, and these data
are described elsewhere [16, 17].Police custody suites are frenetic and chaotic environ-
ments, [18–20] and early experiences within phases 1
and 2 of the HELP-PC project identified that there was
likely to be more to successful health screening and risk
assessment than the ‘screening tool’ alone. Custody risk
assessment takes place across UK jurisdictions, being a
statutory task in England, Wales & Northern Ireland
[21, 22] and as part of custody procedure in Scotland
[23]. All detainees who have been arrested and detained
in police custody are the responsibility of the COs. COs
are required to screen each and every detainee to ascer-
tain whether they are fit for detention, need to see a
Health Care Professional (forensic physician or nurse)
for a specific intervention relating to their physical or
mental health, or require special assistance by an ‘Appro-
priate Adult’ when they undergo police interview due to
their mental vulnerability [24]. COs are also responsible
for the transfer of detainees to emergency departments
should this be required. In UK practice, the healthcare
provision in police custody suites has traditionally been
provided by a forensic physician, usually contactable by
telephone, and sometimes responsible for a number of
custody suites. More recently, forensic nurses have
started to assume these responsibilities, and are often
present 24 h a day in the custody suite.
COs are expected to perform this task under signifi-
cant pressure. During phases 1 and 2 of the HELP-PC
project, researchers witnessed the conduct of risk assess-
ment screening by COs being affected by factors such as
the busy and unpredictable nature of events within the
custody suite, and challenging and uncooperative behav-
iour from custody detainees. It was therefore important
to understand how factors relating to the police staff, de-
tainees, and events in custody may impact on standard
screening processes and on the potential implementation
of enhanced procedures in routine practice. To date,
there is little published research that includes data from
interviews with police custody staff, structured observa-
tions and the views of detainees regarding health screen-
ing in custody. Given the complexities identified in this
sphere, implementation science can contribute to under-
standing the successful application of an intervention
such as health screening or risk assessment, by providing
a lens for investigating the implementation of screening
that brings attention to factors affecting implementation
‘in practice’ [25].
Normalization Process Theory [NPT], as a recognised
theoretical approach within the implementation science
field, was applied during phase 3 of the study in parallel
to the piloting of a new risk assessment screening tool in
one London custody suite. NPT is a theory of imple-
mentation that explains the embedding and integration
of a new practice within a setting, with reference to the
individual and collaborative work required to achieve
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four constructs which assist in understanding the practi-
calities of making interventions work in everyday prac-
tice. A change in practice – and the tasks required of it
– must make sense to the participants involved in the
work (coherence). There must also be a commitment
amongst participants to engage, both collectively and in-
dividually, in the work required of the intervention
(cognitive participation). Participants must also be able
to accomplish the work required of them (collective
action). Collective action is achieved both in terms of
how participants interact with the technology or inter-
vention (workability) and through the relations amongst
the different aspects of work involved (integration).
Finally, there must be scope for participants to assess
and appraise the effects of the intervention on their
work and make modifications to the intervention or its
organisation (reflexive monitoring) in order for a change
in practice to become embedded. NPT thus provides a
way of understanding why – and how – new practices
become embedded, by focusing our attention on the
work that is required to achieve it within the environ-
ment where the work is conducted.
The aim of this present study, which took place along-
side the pilot of the new risk assessment screening tool
[16], was to:
1. Develop an understanding of the barriers to
performing effective screening;
2. Understand the impact of the screening tool on
practice within the custody suite;
3. Identify factors that could hinder or facilitate the
future implementation of a new screening intervention.
Methods
Context of the present study
This qualitative study was conducted alongside phase 3 of
the HELP-PC quantitative evaluation which studied the
sensitivity and specificity of a new health screening risk as-
sessment conducted by COs in London, UK. The develop-
ment of and quantitative evaluation of the new risk
assessment screen has been described previously [16]. In
summary, a new structured, interactive screening proced-
ure using evidence based tools was developed by the re-
search team, in conjunction with the police during 2011.
It was then piloted by a team of 12 COs in one police cus-
tody suite in London between May and August 2012, with
over 1200 detainees undergoing the new pilot risk assess-
ment screen instead of the standard NSPIS process.
Study design
Alongside the piloting phase of the new risk assessment
screen in summer 2012, three key sources of qualitative
data were obtained for analysis:1. Observational field notes to capture events in the
custody suite;
2. Confidential audio recorded semi-structured inter-
views with police custody staff (custody officers and
forensic nurses);
3. Comments obtained from detainees during clinical
research interviews.
Normalization Process Theory (NPT) was used to in-
form the interview topic guides and also as a focus for
the field observations as well as providing a framework
on which to reflect on the findings [26].
Researcher characteristics
At the time of this study, IM was a fully registered med-
ical professional, a trainee in psychiatry, and was under-
taking his National Institute for Health Research (NIHR)
Doctoral Research Fellowship. He had also undertaken
training in qualitative research, and elements of
ethnography.
Field observations
Observational information in and around the custody
suite was gathered; this included the observation of offi-
cers, other staff and non-staff participants, as well as re-
flections on notable scenarios. Examples of these
included episodes where events in the custody suite im-
pacted on COs carrying out their screening role, or
where staff had informal conversations with researchers
about issues relating to issues of detainees’ health and
welfare. Observations took place over the course of the
phase 3 new risk assessment screen pilot between 23
May and 17 August 2012, specifically during periods that
the researcher was present in custody (52 days out of a
total of 74 days’ of data collection related to the screen-
ing tool). As IM was already in the custody suite collect-
ing data for the quantitative evaluation, opportunities for
observations were taken at times when he was not inter-
viewing detainees for that purpose. Therefore the oppor-
tunities to take a view of incidents unfolding or to have
informal discussions with staff or detainees were not
continuous. COs and forensic nurses in the core custody
team were aware of IM’s involvement in the research
project, but it was unfeasible to inform all potential at-
tendees to the custody suite of his presence. Examples of
these “passive participants” included detainees, solicitors,
custody visitors, case investigation officers or members
of police senior management. Disclosure of IM’s purpose
and presence was limited to times when it was relevant
to the particular information obtained (e.g. IM asked a
staff member for permission to use details of an informal
discussion), or when IM was asked about the nature and
purpose of his work. In line with the unpredictable na-
ture of the custody environment, an open approach to
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was taken in order to respond to events on the day.
Observational aspects of data drew on facets of ethnog-
raphy as consistent with the study objectives of under-
standing practices in context [28]. Data from these
periods of observation were collected in anonymised
field notes. Any descriptions of demeanour and observa-
tional clinical data made were intentionally non-specific;
e.g. ‘appears intoxicated’, ‘difficulties understanding ques-
tions’, ‘behaviourally disturbed’. No identifiable data other
than whether the person was an officer, staff member or
detainee were recorded, although a description of a de-
tainee’s age, gender or ethnicity was gathered where rele-
vant. Where a participant divulged a notable comment
for example when IM was observing the custody suite in
general, or during an informal discussion with IM, this
was followed up by respondent validation; IM informed
the participant that he was in an observer role and that
information specific or sensitive to a participant was
used only following consent to use it in an anonymised
form. Field notes were organised and cyphered by date.
Semi-Structured Interviews
Whilst the phase 3 HELP-PC pilot study was taking
place, interviews with the end users of the custody risk
assessment screen, the COs and forensic nurses, were
conducted. All twelve COs and five forensic nurses who
provided round the clock health input for detainees on
site during the observational study were approached for
consent to take part in a structured interview. This was
to obtain their views on what factors impact upon health
screening and risk assessment in the custody suite. COs
and nurses had to find quiet periods where they could
leave the custody suite for these interviews, as well as
the researcher being free from carrying out interviews
for the quantitative part of the HELP-PC study. Ultim-
ately four COs and two forensic nurses were available
and agreed to take part, although others informally indi-
cated their willingness to be involved. It was hoped to
recruit more of the staff members, but because IM was
concurrently collecting data for the quantitative part of
the study, time constraints were a particular factor. In-
terviews were semi-structured supported by a topic
guide [29] which covered the interviewees’ views on risk
assessment screening, what factors impact on its effect-
iveness, their views on improving matters and also their
opinion about the standard and pilot screening tools. In-
terviews lasted between 20 min and 44 min, were audio
recorded using digital recording equipment, transcribed
verbatim, and stored securely on a password-protected
hard drive. One of the interviews was interrupted after
22 min due to the room being booked by another officer,
but it was immediately restarted and finished in an adja-
cent room. Interviews took place in available office spacebehind a closed door in the police station. These inter-
views were confidential and were not disclosed to any-
one else. No repeat interviews were carried out.
Interviewees were given an anonymous identifier as per
their gender and professional role.
Detainees’ comments
The clinical research interview posed to detainees during
the quantitative evaluation included a supplementary
question ‘Do you have any comments about the way the
police asked you about your health problems?’ This was
in order to invite detainees’ views which would contrib-
ute to the overall qualitative data set. Responses were
collated anonymously for analysis. Of the 323 detainees
interviewed during the quantitative part of the project,
148 gave the researchers specific comments on this topic.
Detainees’ comments varied; some replies were short al-
though others gave more involved and thoughtful re-
sponses. These were documented verbatim and included
for analysis with the observations and staff interviews, but
because the main focus of the detainee interviews was the
collection of medical data, time constraints and partici-
pant burden considerations precluded focused qualitative
data collection with detainees. Although the structured
comments lack relative depth, in this evaluation the inclu-
sion of such data provided a breadth of understanding of
the impact of the screening tool, particularly from the de-
tainees’ perspectives. Comments made by individual de-
tainees were coded commensurate with their study
number in the quantitative evaluation.
Data analysis
Data from the observational field notes, interviews with
staff, and comments from detainees were analysed using
the principles of constant comparative methodology
[30]. Data from the three sources were coded separately
using NVivo9 [31]. Codes were continually reviewed as
analysis proceeded, and analysed for emergent themes.
Emergent themes were then arranged under higher level
themes. In the context of the higher level themes, and
with the NPT framework in mind, all of the original
codes were then reviewed again with reference to the
original datasets. Where more appropriate emergent
themes or higher level themes had emerged in the ana-
lysis for specific codes, datasets were reorganised ac-
cordingly. The consistency of interpretation of the codes
emerging from the data was established by both authors
independently coding two of the interview datasets, and
discussing discrepant interpretations. The mapping of
codes into subthemes and intermediate themes was per-
formed jointly by both authors. In this paper, the emer-
gent themes are presented in the results section, and
NPT is used as a framework to reflect on the findings in
the discussion.
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The resultant arrangement of codes, emergent themes
and higher level themes are included in supplementary
files for each of the three datasets. These are:
 Additional file 1 - Framework of codes from
detainee comments;
 Additional file 2 - Framework of codes from field notes;
 Additional file 3 - Framework of codes from semi-
structured interviews with police staff
The coding and theme development is described in
Table 1.
In total 13 higher level themes were generated from
the three data sources. For the presentation of findings
in this paper, these higher level themes were incorpo-
rated into five sets of issues for which the illustrative
data is presented:
1. The workability of risk assessment screening tools;
2. The effect of the custody environment and the
people therein;
3. Shifts in professional roles and interrelationships
amongst staff;
4. Cultural responses to risk and liability in police
work;
5. How infrastructure, knowledge and skills can impact
on detainee safety.
The relationship between the 13 higher level themes
and the five overall constructs is depicted pictorially in
Additional file 4.Table 1 Coding and theme development
Stage Transaction Outcome
Field observations
1 Three Datasets collated between
May and August 2012
↓
10 field observations
over a three month
period (May-Aug 2012)
2 Coding of all transcriptions/datasets
↓
20 codes obtained
from field observations
3 First sorting of codes into
emergent-themes
↓
12 emergent-themes
identified
4 Higher-level themes developed
from emergent-themes
↓
4 higher-level themes
generated
5 Review of codes against transcript
section – and reassignment of code
to higher-level theme if necessary
This stage not
applicable to
this dataset
Codes:
Emergent Themes:
Higher Level Themes:
20
12
4Workability of the risk assessment screening tools
COs and forensic nurses expressed a range of views
about the process of risk assessment screening, empha-
sising aspects such as time constraints, functionality,
making it more user friendly and navigable (See
Table 2). Participants were prompted to discuss risk as-
sessment and screening in general terms. COs
expressed a need for a screen with prompts and ques-
tions that were more relevant than those on the stand-
ard NSPIS screen (evaluated in phases 1 and 2),
although they anticipated that this would take longer,
and found that this was indeed the case with in the
new risk assessment screen pilot phase (in phase 3).
One CO expressed surprise that, until using the new
screen, they had never been prompted to ask about ser-
ious health considerations such as head injuries or alco-
hol withdrawal.
Although these data were collected alongside the
piloting of the new risk assessment screen in phase 3,
staff inevitably commented on both the standard NSPIS
and new screening processes. Staff experienced a range
of challenges in working with both risk assessment
screens. Some felt that both processes were perceived
as ‘tick box’ to the detainees. Some COs thought in
using the new screen, they were being asked to dupli-
cate information being gathered by nurses. Other staff
members, once familiarised with the new screen,
became interested in reflecting on its strengths and
relative weaknesses, giving suggestions on how to
improve various aspects of it. Some detainees who were
regular custody attenders noticed that the questions
had changed since their last visit; some welcomed moreInterviews Detainees’ comments
6 interviews during August 2012 148 detainees’ comments
over a three month
period (May-Aug 2012)
186 Codes obtained from six
interviews (four COs and two nurses)
24 codes obtained from
detainee comments
22 emergent-themes identified 7 emergent-themes
5 higher-level themes
generated
4 higher-level
themes generated
Six new emergent-themes identified
- data eventually arranged into:5 higher
level themes, 28 emergent-themes &
186 codes
This stage not applicable
to this dataset
186
28
5
24
7
4
Table 2 Workability of the screening tool and its items
FIELD OBSERVATIONS
“Sergeants are getting a little quicker after just a few goes. Amazing
what they pick up on that the study team hadn’t considered.”
(Field note in custody para 2: 23 May 2012)
STAFF INTERVIEWS
“You can scrap (the old screening tool)…you can have people with
potentially life threatening conditions who can walk through that…”
(Male nurse 1)
“You think ‘blimey they were leaving that to us weren’t they?’
We’re more informed now.”
(Male CO 1)
“Alcohol withdrawal, head injuries, medication… the [new]
questionnaire highlights [them]. We never had [those previously].”
(Male CO 3)
DETAINEE COMMENTS
“It was flippant. Very much a check list approach just like
in supermarket.”
(Male Detainee 338)
“They’re very callous when asking questions as if to say ‘look,
I’m reading you a list, just answer ‘no’ so I can get on.”
(Male Detainee 29)
“They’re getting into it a little bit more […]. It was a good thing.”
(Male Detainee 234)
“There was a lot more they could have asked. ‘Did you drop,
did you fall? [’...] Sometimes you don’t know until later.”
(Male Detainee 117)
“Spent a lot of time on physical rather than mental illness.”
(Male Detainee 311)
Table 3 Effect of the custody environment and the people therein
FIELD OBSERVATIONS
“I spoke to the nurse regarding referrals to the local mental health
services. He seemed rather vague about the referral criteria, and about
what they would do when the local services would not see a detainee.”
(Field note in custody para 4: 25 May 2012)
STAFF INTERVIEWS
“You could be dealing with a dozen active prisoners […] standing there
staring at you, waiting [...] you just want to rush through the risk
assessment just to get them out of the way. Time is the most crucial
thing […] you can’t rush through it and tick lots of ‘YESes or NOs’ just
by looking at them. Sometimes even the most straightforward question
can take ages.”
(Male CO2)
“Ideally you should, in your formal handover, not only talk about the
offence […] but also their risk assessment […] It should be formal,
but generally, because it’s the end of your shift, you want to go.”
(Male CO3)
“Some people just will not cooperate no matter how much you’re
trying to help them […] Others are so drunk [that] they don’t know
where they are.”
(Male CO2)
“[Detainees] aren’t particularly forthcoming, even if it puts themselves
at risk […] So you get people sitting in cells [who are] in life threatening
situations”
(Male nurse 1)
“You’ve got constant communication with a nurse and people’s health
can change rapidly. They [can] access to some information [or] previous
records etcetera whilst we could be booking in the next person. They
can actually say ‘do you know what Sarge, I think it might be this as
well’ so you’ve got an ongoing continual assessment [with the nurse
there]…it’s a massive difference.”
(Male CO1)
“One of the biggest issues we do have is people not being completely
honest with us. If we got access for example to their GP records, we can
verify [what they tell us] very quickly …”
(Male nurse 1)
“[Other places] have got mental health nurses. The mental health nurses
decide whether to call out the crisis team or not. [Here] we don’t have
mental health nurses; it’s either us or the Crisis Team.”
(Female nurse 1)
“Sometimes a custody suite is not the best place for an individual to be.
There are probably other ways in which they could be dealt with. Not
everybody needs to be arrested”
(Female CO1)
DETAINEE COMMENTS
“They should ask you about your health in a more discreet fashion. They
should check you into your cell and then ask you in private. People
would talk more then.”
(Female Detainee 202)
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(Table 2).
The effect of the custody environment and the people
therein
Custody suites are busy, chaotic places, and the data re-
vealed several ways in which the risk assessment tool did
not fit well with the existing practices and demands of
the custody environment (Table 3).
The behaviour, attitudes, and intoxicated state of some
detainees were seen by staff to impact upon the effect-
iveness of risk assessment. Staff were also concerned that
the adversarial nature of the custody environment could
dissuade detainees from disclosing important informa-
tion about their health, such as mental health problems,
or significant physical issues, and that consequently
withholding this information could be detrimental to de-
tainees’ welfare whilst in custody.
Lack of reliability of information from detainees in-
creased the importance of professional lines of commu-
nication. Although COs saw the availability of
permanent custody nurses as a positive factor in hand-
ling risk compared to the old system of a forensic phys-
ician on call, the appropriateness of managing some of
the more serious health problems in custody was ques-
tioned by both professional groups. Access to General
Practice records was suggested as advantageous. Hand-
overs between officers’ shifts was also raised as animportant vehicle to communicate important informa-
tion about risk, but the lack of time meant that this in-
formation is not always effectively passed on.
Forensic nurses were frustrated by the lack of re-
sources available to manage detainees with mental health
conditions, especially the availability and responsiveness
of community mental health services and crisis teams. It
became apparent that some of the nurses were unclear
about the protocols to obtain definitive assessments and
management of acutely mentally unwell individuals.
These responses demonstrate the situated nature of
risk assessment work within the challenging custody
environment.
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amongst staff
Using the new pilot health risk assessment screening
tool raised questions about the relative roles and respon-
sibilities of those involved in and beyond the custody en-
vironment (Table 4). Health screening of police custody
detainees is a statutory requirement in England and
Wales, and is the responsibility of the CO. There is an
extended role for civilian staff called Detention Officers
in performing the risk assessments, which has caused
concerns for COs about their levels of individual respon-
sibility for detainees’ health and wellbeing, especially
where COs are being called upon to ‘supervise’ Deten-
tion Officers in taking on a role for which COs had legal
responsibility.
It was clear that COs sometimes experience a tension
between the role of custodian and their welfare role.
There were conflicting views between COs and forensic
nurses regarding who should perform health screening.
Some nurses thought that they should do this as a health
care specialist, but recognised that currently limited re-
sources would prevent it. Some COs felt that the way
they managed risky detainees had changed over time es-
pecially in the light of changes to corporate manslaugh-
ter legislation. This was then seen as having become a
much more defensive role than when some of the more
seasoned officers first started working in custody.Table 4 Shifts in professional roles and interrelationships
amongst staff
STAFF INTERVIEWS
“We are here to ensure that person’s safety and their wellbeing,
regardless of what they have done. You have to detach yourself
from what they have done.”
(Female CO1)
“Any medical screening should be done by a health care professional
[and] with some sort of training. It shouldn’t be done by the custody
sergeants. Some of them are very good and very knowledgeable,
but I think that should be separate to the role”
(Male nurse 1)
“Would we have the time to do the risk assessments and see people?
We can’t even get the nurses we need, let alone [more]”
(Female nurse 1)
“In [another police station] they have got 42 cells [and] they have two
or three custody officers to oversee inputters’ risk assessments. You
cannot monitor the behaviour of two detainees at the same time to
make your judgement. Some poor Sergeant, hopefully not me, will be
taken to task over it.”
(Female CO1)
“You’re just mindful of the new legislation [regarding] if someone dies
in custody. If you haven’t done a half decent risk assessment you could
be in a lot of trouble. You still have to write up, from your brief
observations as they pass you, exactly what their issues are.”
(Male CO2)
DETAINEE COMMENTS
“They were really concerned and help was provided.”
(Male Detainee 333)
“They should give up the questions. It’s too much to cope with
when you first come in. [They should] get the doctor for everybody.”
(Male Detainee 56)Detainees held a range of views on the efforts of COs
to look after their welfare. Some detainees found it diffi-
cult to understand that a uniformed officer’s duties
could be consistent with looking after their safety. While
some were sceptical about being screened by the CO,
others had a better experience. Some detainees thought
that a doctor or nurse should see all of the detainees,
and that there was little to be gained by police officers
asking health related questions.Cultural responses to risk and liability in police work
A key theme in the data revealed how policing culture
impacted on the conduct of screening and risk assess-
ment (Table 5). Participants’ comments reflected a per-
ception that a ‘blame culture’ within the organisation
filters down to COs, causing them to be risk averse. COs
bring valuable professional experience to the screening
process, but also draw on pre-formed ideas about mental
health conditions when making judgements. Such ‘cogni-
tive shortcuts’ may be taken for a number of purposes,
such as reducing custody processing times or remaining
in one’s skills comfort zone. The introduction of a struc-
tured and comprehensive screening tool thus challenges
more instinctive practice.
Detainees sometimes felt that they were not taken ser-
iously by COs and nurses, and it was apparent that for
some staff members, a sense of cynicism may have crept
in after years of working in custody. One forensic nurse
thought that the police had developed an ‘all or nothing’
view of mental health conditions that had developed
from their experience that community mental health ser-
vices would only respond to the most disturbed de-
tainees, overlooking less poorly detainees who still have
care needs.
There was a sense that COs felt under pressure to
process detainees through custody as quickly as possible
and that this may lead to them not paying enough atten-
tion to their health needs in difficult circumstances.How infrastructure, knowledge and skills can impact on
detainee safety
Health screening in the custody environment requires
particular forms of knowledge and skills, which varies
amongst those involved in the process (Table 6). COs
valued their own experiences in making health and wel-
fare judgements, but had little formal training. Some
staff felt that although training was important, it was
ephemeral within the organisation. The personal qual-
ities of the individuals involved are also a factor in deter-
mining the approach to the whole concept of looking
after detainee welfare. There was clear evidence that
some COs were able to use the information and exercise
discretion where appropriate.
Table 5 Cultural responses to risk and liability in police work
FIELD OBSERVATIONS
“[I saw an] elderly detainee with Parkinson’s disease, on ropinirole
medication [and an] indwelling urethral catheter [who had been]
arrested on harassment charges. [The] nurse thinks that he has the
catheter for the purpose of deriving sexual gratification [and] was
unaware that ropinirole can cause sexual disinhibition. … [Nurse]
continued to have the opinion that he was just a ‘nasty old man’.”
(Field note in custody paras 1, 2 &3: 27 May 2012)
“Detainees with multiple medical problems and a range of behaviourally
disturbed presentations. Sergeants [were] keeping their cool. Voices
were raised, and as a result the detainee’s voice is raised further and
becomes more agitated. I suspect that a degree of frustration creeps in
amongst the sergeants in these situations as they see a lot of this kind
of presentation.”
(Field note in custody para 1: 15 June 2012)
“… [Detention officers] calling the detainee a ‘pain in the backside’.
It is not difficult to sympathise with this point of view given the
demands that are placed upon them by various detainees. However,
it appears that they find it easy to ascribe behavioural disturbance to
purely intrinsic factors but do not give consideration to any possible
mitigating factors.”
(Field note in custody para 1: 15 June 2012)
STAFF INTERVIEWS
“[The] thing that worries me most is missing something - so for instance
going home with that ‘Oh God’ feeling” (Male CO1)
“If they’re just mentally ill but they’re not having a crisis, they have to be
dealt with as normal. I have been told in the past by the Crisis Team,
‘Well, we won’t come out; send them to prison – send them to court in
the morning. Let them sort it out from there’.”
(Female nurse 1)
“People will always hurt themselves. I used to go, ‘Well more fool them.’
But I think, as I’ve had this role, you then go, ‘You’ve got a responsibility
to look after them’.”
(Male CO3)
“Everything was covered in the pilot; it was just covered in too many
questions. …I just feel that we have created…more work for ourselves
where we’re taking less chances…some (custody officers) will not take a
single chance… you’ve lost half your staff because they’re dealing with
the constant watch.”
(Male CO2)
DETAINEE COMMENTS
“Would like them to be more thorough about the state of mind.
They should be more concerned. It’s like they don’t care.”
(Male Detainee 2)
“You see the nurse, tell them what the tablets are but you don’t get
them. They don’t check on you.”
(Female Detainee 284)
“Didn’t like the way [the CO] judged me.’ You’re an alcoholic and crack
and heroin addict.’ Think it messed my head up.”
(Male Detainee 124)
Table 6 How infrastructure, knowledge and skills can impact on
detainee safety
FIELD OBSERVATIONS
“The Sergeant… had seen a detainee over the weekend who had been
caught removing items from a supermarket. I also saw the man who
clearly had some form of cognitive impairment. He gave the man a
verbal warning and contacted his sister to see if she could get him to
see the GP. Earlier this morning, [the Sergeant] had tried to contact the
sister again to see if she had managed to make any progress. It
transpires that the sister had a stroke and died the previous day. The
Sergeant and I had a discussion about this as he was clearly quite
shocked. We talked about a number of things but the conversation
culminated with us talking about how occasionally he sees people in
custody who have real needs and that they can make a difference. He
allowed me to use his exact words ‘We see so much s**t in here; we
forget how to deal with the nice people’.”
(Field note paras 1&2: 25 July 2012)
STAFF INTERVIEWS
“There is a custody course, about the people we deal with. But I think
you learn so much by doing it rather than any course. We’ve had a
death in custody and unfortunately it takes a death, sometimes for
[serious issues] to come to the limelight.”
(Male CO3)
“The organisation takes a massive risk unless you have got someone
trained sitting in a busy custody suite. But what Police Officers get in
training is very minimal when it comes to mental health and why
people behave in certain ways.”
(Female CO1)
“On some occasions, the police officer straight away says ‘Oh, and we’ve
brought their insulin in with them,’ but that tends to be a very on the
ball police officer [who] knows the nurse is going to ask for certain
medications: the first thing they say to [the arrested person] is ‘Is there
any medications you would like to bring in with you?’ Risk assessment
should start way before they even get to the custody suite.”
(Female nurse 1)
“Not very many [custody nurses] have had mental health training.
Most of them are from [emergency departments] and [medical
admissions wards] and things like that.”
(Female nurse 1)
“I think that you learn to identify certain medications when people tell
you they are on them. You learn to identify that certain medications are
for certain ailments.”
(Female CO1)
“Given my experience, it was quite clear he was Asperger’s. I said to the
[detention officers], ‘When you deal with him you’re going to have to
give clear explanations.’ They said ‘… he was really odd with the
fingerprint machine. He couldn’t cope with that at all’.”
(Female nurse 1)
DETAINEE COMMENTS
“I told the police I’ve got asthma, I’d left [the inhaler) at home. They
didn’t ask how severe the asthma was just how often do I get it. They
did not offer to get me my pump or to get a pump for me.”
(Male Detainee 34)
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need for medication should be considered before the de-
tainee arrived in custody, which would require greater
awareness among all officers, not just those working in
custody.Discussion
The results reveal that there are many variables impact-
ing on the capacity of staff working in a police custody
suite to ensure that detainees’ health concerns are ad-
equately managed. There are complex issues related tothe people, processes, environment and cultural factors
that exist in police custody settings, which impact on
the conduct of health screening.
This study focused on the introduction of a new health
risk assessment screen into police custody. It sought to
identify factors affecting successful screening in general,
how a new screening tool impacts on practice within the
custody environment, and to inform how future imple-
mentation in routine practice might be hindered or
facilitated. A range of data sources were used including
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COs and forensic nurses, and detainee viewpoints.
There are a number of potential barriers to the effect-
ive conduct of health screening that were apparent
from studying the use of the new screening tool in
practice. From an NPT perspective, issues of workabil-
ity which in this study refers to the ease of use of the
tool in the custody context, were important. For ex-
ample, there was resistance amongst COs to lengthen-
ing screening procedures due to perceived pressure to
reduce custody processing times. Staff and detainees
saw a busy environment and lack of privacy as an im-
pediment to divulging important health issues, thus re-
lational challenges were apparent. Situational factors
distract COs from the assessment task, or put pressures
on time for optimal screening. The range and acuity of
morbidity in custody suites mirrors emergency depart-
ments [4, 32] yet COs are tasked with identifying these
and taking appropriate action.
The implementation of the new screening tool had
some observable impacts on practice within the custody
environment. The concept of an improved screening
tool had ‘made sense’ (held ‘coherence’ in NPT terms)
on some levels - the existing NSPIS screening tool used
by the police was seen as inadequate, lacking in opportun-
ities to probe detainees further, and lacking the coverage
of health issues required by the Police and Criminal Evi-
dence Act (PACE) [21]. Some COs found the new risk as-
sessment screen’s prompts and interactive ‘guidance’
helpful to steer their decision making. Similar compu-
terised prompts have been shown to be useful in decision
making in General Practice, [33] with thorough training to
use decision aids improving end users’ confidence [34].
NPT provides a framework for understanding the ways
in which implementing new practices can alter the rela-
tions amongst those involved, and their relative contri-
butions to the work. The screening tool altered
perceptions of roles and inter-professional relationships
within and beyond the custody suite. Some police staff
felt that professional boundaries among staff in the cus-
tody suite had become blurred, with COs being asked to
pose more detailed screening questions akin to those
used by forensic nurses. Equally nurses felt they were
better placed to screen detainees for health and welfare
considerations, although this was not their statutory role
under PACE. Furthermore, civilian staff becoming
screening ‘data-inputters’ received a mixed response
from COs who were concerned about having to take
personal responsibility for information gathered by less
experienced staff. It is not possible to ascertain who is
best placed to perform the risk assessment screen, but it
is notable that COs expressed feeling more likely to
document morbidity where there was a nurse readily
available in the custody suite. In Tayside, one studyfound that strong collaborations between police officers
and nurses strengthened the operational integrity of the
service [35]. However data from this study suggests that
some nurses may lack skills and confidence in some
areas of health morbidity frequently encountered in po-
lice custody. COs emphasised the importance of their in-
stincts and judgements, however, it remains unclear how
much these positively affect decision making. Judge-
ments are also influenced by COs’ and nurses’ assess-
ments of the truthfulness of detainees’ accounts. Police
staff perceived that detainees could be ‘hard to like’
whilst acknowledging that reason for arrest had to be set
to one side. Underestimation of risk to health and safety
among ‘hard to like’ individuals has been highlighted in
psychiatric settings [36]. In an unpublished work, hypo-
thetical risk scenarios were posed to eight COs, finding
marked variations in their risk perceptions due to inad-
equacies of risk assessment tools, lack of training, and
decision making based on heuristic processes [37]. From
an NPT perspective, the embedding of the screening tool
into routine practice requires attention to resolving is-
sues of relational integration [38]. Having a standard
screening tool, with a supportive process, thus appears
important for all stakeholders in the health screening
process [37].
The integration of the new risk assessment screen -
and health morbidity screening generally - into wider
police and custody processes is likely to be challenging.
On an ideological level, a tendency towards risk aver-
sion, individual liability and (as described by some par-
ticipants) a ‘blame culture’ within policing, may inhibit
wider implementation of improved screening processes.
The identification of health problems or wellbeing con-
cerns for detainees necessitates an appropriate response,
and our study participants highlighted concerns about
staff having the appropriate skills to deal with these is-
sues. From a practical perspective, COs and nurses con-
sidered that difficulties accessing services, especially
mental health care for detainees could have a significant
bearing on how they answered the screening questions.
In particular there was little awareness of, or ability to
respond appropriately to the less clear cut cases of
detainees with mental health conditions; embedded
Criminal Justice Liaison and Diversion services were not
in place during this study. It may be that their introduc-
tion into police custody can positively impact on police
decision making and confidence, and although data re-
garding its effectiveness show promising results [39–42]
this has yet to be fully established. Another example of
difficulties with the availability of services once a prob-
lem is identified relates to Appropriate Adults (AA).
Despite a statutory requirement to obtain AAs for
“vulnerable detainees” [21] a recent report highlighted
that the best predictor for AA use by the police was not
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depending on local arrangements [24].
In this study, bureaucracy and a lack of perceived sup-
port from senior colleagues were highlighted as impacting
on their ability to perform the custody role. Compatibility
issues between systems and lack of adequate IT infrastruc-
ture, although not detailed in the results presented in this
paper, were also apparent during this study and would
need to be resolved for wider implementation [43].
Given the multitude of police roles, other pressures
such as improving crime clear up rates may render
forces reluctant to use scarce resources performing more
detailed risk assessment screening, especially where they
perceive they are trying to do nothing more than prevent
rare events such as deaths in custody [44, 45]. Police
were also concerned about increasing referrals to the fo-
rensic nurse or physician, but this was not borne out by
the quantitative data which showed that referrals
remained unaffected by using the pilot risk assessment
screen [16].
Integration of the data from health screening with
other police systems and health records was also raised
in this study. In combination, an apparent lack of trust
among detainees about the police handling their sensi-
tive information, and a lack of access to detainees’ health
records against which to triangulate their disclosures
serves as a further barrier to confidence in screening. In-
tegrating such records has proved difficult [46] although
since this study all forensic nurses and physicians in
London have access to the National Health Service
(NHS) Summary Care Record (personal communication
– Sergeant Cathy Nicholson via email 7 July 2016). Fur-
thermore it is unclear whether integration between
health and police records will facilitate trust between the
two parties. Similar challenges in the integration of in-
formation across health and social care services have
been identified in research using NPT to understand the
lack of integration of telecare for chronic disease man-
agement [47]. This would be important to explore in fur-
ther research in this context.
This study has also raised questions about when the
process of risk assessment begins. COs felt that detainee
screening should commence prior to detainees arriving
in custody. This would appear to be a highly problematic
concept given the issue of availability and delivery of ap-
propriate training for all police officers, community sup-
port staff, and health care professionals revealed in this
study [48]. It is therefore unclear how this might be opti-
mally delivered. However during this study a structured
Vulnerability Assessment Framework for the identifica-
tion of mental health conditions by members of the pub-
lic was being trialled by the Metropolitan Police Service
(MPS) by officers ‘on the beat’ [49], and as a result this
is now in place across London [50].A limitation is that this is a relatively small qualitative
study, although combining the observations, interview
data and comments from detainees about their experi-
ences provides a detailed understanding of stakeholders’
experiences of working with health and screening pro-
cesses in this environment. There were only a small
number of participants in appropriate positions from
whom to sample for the formal interviews. It may be
that there were other points of view among staff mem-
bers who were not interviewed, thus raising the question
of lack of data saturation, and limited external validity in
relation to other custody settings nationally and inter-
nationally. However, efforts were undertaken to ensure
good representation of available staff, including remind-
ing police staff of the requests to take part. Furthermore,
the main investigator (IM) was concurrently undertaking
other research in the custody suite, which may have
coloured participants’ responses to interviews, or chan-
ged staff behaviours knowing that there was a partici-
pant observer present. Asking detainees for only brief
comments was pragmatic given they had already under-
gone a detailed clinical evaluation, but this will inevitably
have caused an uneven balance in their contributions to
this dataset relative to the police staff. More detailed
evaluation of detainees view is therefore recommended
in future work.
The contribution of observational data to this study
is a strength. Given the time pressured nature of the
environment, focused observation allowed us to im-
prove the efficiency of interviews by shaping the focus
of questioning towards key issues, and also presented
opportunities to follow up emerging issues through in-
formal conversations captured as part of the fieldwork.
To date, appraisals of screening tools in custodial set-
tings have been limited, and there have been no qualita-
tive studies of this process. This study thus adds
significantly to research in this field by providing an ac-
count of the human, organisational, professional and
contextual factors that affect how screening procedures
take place, which to our knowledge has not previously
been described in this way.
Since these data were collected in 2012, there have
been a number of developments to police custody
healthcare in England and Wales. It was envisioned that
the commissioning of healthcare would transfer to the
NHS in 2016 as is the case in Scotland, but this did not
take place [51]. There have also been moves to commis-
sion healthcare services, often outsourced from third
party providers, with concerns raised about the stan-
dards of training of healthcare professionals [52], again
in contrast to the situation in Scotland where national
standards are established [53]. However, screening by
COs still remains a statutory role in most UK jurisdic-
tions, and the relationship between police officers and
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health and safety, as highlighted within this study.
As mentioned above, the introduction of mental health
Criminal Justice Liaison and Diversion Teams following
the Bradley Report [54] means that there is now a wider
access to mental health assessment and intervention in
police custody suites. Future research relating to custody
healthcare and risk assessment screening, should exam-
ine the role of these teams in effective screening and de-
livery of mental health interventions.
One police force in England (Northumbria Police) has
now implemented the new “HELP-PC risk assessment
tool” (since June 2016), with other police forces across
the UK expressing an interest in it. Evaluation work with
Northumbria Police is now underway, which will allow
any further revisions to be made.
This study highlights the issues that need to be consid-
ered for optimal integration of health morbidity screen-
ing in custody, and the barriers that need to be
addressed. In relation to Normalization Process Theory
[26], the data from this study highlighted in some detail,
issues concerning both ‘workability’ and ‘integration’ of
the screening tool within practice on the custody suite,
which are aspects of ‘collective action’ as presented with
NPT. However, the data also indicated insights into
wider implementation and integration of health screen-
ing within police work that if implemented more widely,
are likely to raise important issues concerning boundar-
ies between police work and ‘health’ work.
Conclusions
This qualitative study shows that there is more to screen-
ing police custody detainees than simply delivering a
screening tool. There needs to be consideration of the de-
manding environment in which this is performed, chan-
ging professional roles in custody, the influence of cultural
aspects within the police and the need for more robust
training for officers. It also needs to be considered
whether every vulnerable detainee needs to be in police
custody. Although improving the appropriateness and
comprehensiveness of the risk assessment tools used in
police custody has value, its utility will be diminished un-
less appropriate health services are available for detainees.
It is recommended that any future implementation of
novel risk assessment screening tools in police custody,
seeks to investigate these issues in more depth with an
integrative mixed methods approach. This must ad-
equately acknowledge the views of detainees, which
should be central to any evaluation of the effectiveness
of screening and risk assessment processes.
Endnotes
1The National Strategy for Police Information Systems
(NSPIS) custody management system was widely usedby police forces in England and Wales for custody offi-
cers to record and store custody information. The de-
tainee booking-in part of this system includes a health
screen/risk assessment, which was the focus of the ori-
ginal evaluation in 2009–10.
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